

12 July 1945.

1. SUBJECT: Character sketch of SCHLENNBERG; chief of German Espionage Service.

SOURCE: SS-Sturmabfuhrer Dr. Wilhelm ROST, chief referent Group VI E, NSRL.

1. SCHLENNBERG's meteoric rise to power, despite the initial handicap of youth and a high party number, has been considered a remarkable feat by his admirers as well as by his detractors. To a very large degree it can be attributed to sheer ability and indomitable industry, the hallmarks of success in all free countries, but not necessarily in Nazi Germany where the accidents of race and political background weigh heavily.

2. SCHLENNBERG had his start in politics in his hometown Saarbrücken, where he taught "Rechtsschulung" in the local unit of the Allgemeine SS. In 1934 he was taken on by the Sicherheitsdienst and posted to the personnel department of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Amt I). At that time the SD was still in its formative stage and consequently Amt I was of pivotal importance. Beyond the narrow confines of a second-string position, SCHLENNBERG held at first, he soon began to exert considerable influence. His conspicuous talent for organization did not escape the attention of the all-powerful chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, HEYDRICH, who soon took him under his wings. In the course of time the relationship SCHLENNBERG-HEYDRICH deepened and besides being counted among HEYDRICH's most trusted co-workers, he enjoyed the rare privilege of invitations to his chief's home. He stood high in the favor of Frau LIN, (HEYDRICH's wife whose power sufficed to make the Hungarian shake in his boots), so much so that it was generally expected he would marry the widow after HEYDRICH's death. LIN, with her husband's timely demise Frau LIN had outlived her usefulness for SCHLENNBERG.

3. SCHLENNBERG's career took a decisive turn in the direction of where his real talents lay when he was transferred to Amt IV (Geheime Staatspolizei) and appointed group chief IV E. IV E (later IV A 3) was the counter-intelligence branch of the NSDAP, the ideal proving ground for raw and untried methods of espionage work developed on the enemy side. SCHLENNBERG never busied himself with routine Gestapo matters and his most outstanding attainment in that period, the abduction of two prominent British agents WERNER and JOSEF (Wienlo-Dietrich), was an Amt VI undertaking, with SCHLENNBERG as the only Amt IV man taking a decisive part in the planning. At the time he moved to Amt VI, his reputation as a "Nachrichtsmann" was established and, besides, he had worked himself up to a position of the next to SS-Gruppenfuhrer KUEHLER (Chief, Amt IV), most powerful man in Amt IV.

4. It soon went without describing the circumstances surrounding SCHLENNBERG's accession to power in Amt VI at some length, because they bring out some of his most salient characteristics, among them the conspicuous absence of moral scruples in achieving his ends.

Already in 1935 SCHLENNBERG had made up his mind to oust the then chief of Amt VI - SS-Brigadefuhrer JOSEF - of whose abilities he had a low estimate. At that time the main stumbling block was SS-Brigadefuhrer Dr. STAEHEL, the most serious candidate a vacancy left by JOSEF. HEYDRICH who feared that STAEHEL cast his net even wider, decided for the lesser evil and on to JOSEF while waiting for more propitious circumstances in which to effect the change-over.

5. In autumn 1941 the time appeared ripe. SS-Sturmabfuhrer SCHLENNBERG was appointed deputy chief Amt VI (he signed all official documents as 'Chef VI/V') and given the specific mission by HEYDRICH to build up a damaging case against JOSEF. SCHLENNBERG went about this task with his customary circumspection. Regierungsrat ROST came together with Dr.

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HANUCH (chief investigator of the NSHA), had been told (through the franciscan) and put it on a legally sound basis, was attached to SCHLEIERBERG. The three let no grass grow under their foot and in due time managed to uncover certain misdemeanors on the part of JOST. JOST, as it turned out, has been wanting to build a little house for himself in Berlin. He lacked ready cash and accepted the offer of SS Obersturmbannfuhrer VOLLMER, group chief VI.0, to arrange for a cheap credit with a banking house in Prague. This rather innocuous transaction changed, after the trio had given matters the proper slant, as a full-fledged case of bribery, implicating besides JOST, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr. FRIEDT and SS-Sturmfuhrer LIPPER. Pending investigation they were to drag on for years, JOST was relieved of his post and, in October 1941, SCHLEIERBERG appointed deputy chief of VI.

6. SCHALLENERG's appointment was to be a milestone in the history of the German espionage service. He has set his sights high: his aim was no less than the creation of an all-inclusive Espionage service in Germany, doing away with the nefarious quality of political and military espionage, the latter the exclusive domain of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht through its Amt Ausland. His endeavours towards that aim were at first none too successful. SCHALLENERG himself was to blame for what. In his eagerness to clean the Augean stables of Amt VI his innate distrust of man and man's motives drove him too far. He purged most of the experienced group chiefs from his staffs and replaced them by young inexperienced men whose talents lagged considerably behind the enthusiasm they brought to the job.

7. In 1943 the personnel crisis had been finally overcome and the ascendancy of VI within the RSHA began to make itself felt. It coincided with the appointment of Dr. WILHELM RUNNER to Commandeur der Sicherheitspolizei. In contradistinction to HE BRICH, WILHELM RUNNER evinced a lively interest in the foreign espionage branch of the RSHA, putting the full weight of his position behind the expansion of VII VI and the improvement of its services. As a matter of course, the preferential treatment accorded VII came into the open, and the former had to be handed a sizable portion of a slice of Heinrich III. Still in spring 1944, after the major military disaster had been consummated, JOSEPH B. BERN had reason to be fearful of concentrated power in the RSHA, a position he had good to fear was in the aftermath of the 20th July.

8. To form a correct estimate of Scorsese as a character, one must have known him over a considerable period of time. This might seem like a truism. If it were not for the fact that his character is of inordinately complex, masterfully disguised, snap judgments are bound to be either superficial or erroneous. E.g. to let Scorsese in the common mold of a liberal youngster carried on through a variety of late would be missing the main point. Neither he nor Wells are bound to give their life both sui generis.

9. SCHLENGER is a consummate actor. He can turn on the charm and when he does, the impression of being face to face with a nice, carefree and quite ingenuitous young man is all but irresistible. SCHLENGER has a habit of looking the person he talks to deep into the eyes as if he were trying to convey "look, what I am telling you is absolutely springs from the depths of my heart, and you can believe me, I might as well confess to it". In real life SCHLENGER is an ice cold, over calculating realist, who leaves nothing to chance and who even in his 'weak moments' knows how to regulate his impression he sees fit to give. SCHLENGER knows what he wants, he knows how to get there and need be over corpses. For SCHLENGER the words "friendship" and "loyalty" bear no meaning, nor does he expect either from others.

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17. To what extent SCHLENNBERG was actually able to influence HIMMLER's decisions is difficult to gauge. Although he was intellectually far superior to HIMMLER, his natural inclination not to come out into the open with his true convictions tended to minimize his influence. At the same time he developed a remarkable skill in instilling certain beliefs or opinions into HIMMLER, making him think that it was actually his own original idea which SCHLENNBERG had merely put into words.
18. As an established fact SCHLENNBERG fanned HIMMLER's strong dislike for KALTENBRUNNER. His weapons: the sly insinuation in preference to blunt accusations. An aside comment on KALTENBRUNNER's increasing powers and independence, a passing remark upon his strong Austrian proclivities worked wonders with HIMMLER; and SCHLENNBERG knew it.
19. SCHLENNBERG had nobody in the world he could call his friend. When Regierungsrat Sebastian, one of his oldest friends, was subjected to criminal investigation, SCHLENNBERG dropped him like a hot potato. All chiefs of the Amt were SCHLENNBERG's sworn enemies, especially MULLER of Amt IV who could not forget that SCHLENNBERG at one time had been his subordinate. SCHLENNBERG's colleagues were of course keenly aware of his intellectual superiority. Moreover, they began to feel preponderance of SCHLENNBERG's two Amt (VI and VII Amt) in the RSHA. In the daily meetings of the Amt chiefs, SCHLENNBERG was the butt of their most merciless attacks and frequently he came back to his office like a broken man. Even in his own Amt nobody fully trusted him; with one exception; his faithful secretary Pauline SCHLENKE.
20. SCHLENNBERG's enemies in Amt VI were SS-Sturmbannfuhrer SKORZENY and W. NECK (VI E), SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr. KNOCHEN and RAUFF. SKORZENY and W. NECK were undoubtedly in the good graces of their fellow Austrian KALTENBRUNNER and SCHLENNBERG but this very much. At the same time SCHLENNBERG never hesitated to ask for their help whenever he wanted something from KALTENBRUNNER. He did not ask himself. Then again he played KALTENBRUNNER and SKORZENY out against each other with so much skill that he actually got close to bringing about SKORZENY's downfall. Quite likely, SCHLENNBERG will claim now that he was a prisoner in his Amt, a mere puppet in the hand of KALTENBRUNNER's henchmen W. NECK and SKORZENY. This is not true, however. Both believed in direct action, disregarding channels and banking on SCHLENNBERG's notorious disinclination to face issues squarely. If he had been less of a coward, he could have forced both W. NECK and SKORZENY into line by the sheer weight of his superior intellect and undoubtedly he would have found the backing of KALTENBRUNNER.
21. Despite his manifold talents and his unabashed self-esteem, SCHLENNBERG suffers from a bad case of inferiority complex. This is important to bear in mind. In a great many respects SCHLENNBERG is unfit to stand on his own legs. What the usual observer may possibly think of as a sign of energy is in many instances due to lack of self-assuredness. SCHLENNBERG is unable to cope with many of the demands the routine of daily life makes and certain of his mannerisms typify his lack of confidence in his own abilities. He does not put on but goes into.
22. From the point of view of professional accomplishments, SCHLENNBERG can be rated as belonging to the top layer of Germany's intelligence community. He is primarily known as a spy. As a matter of fact his work is not intelligence work as such, for which he lacks the practical foundation, but his outstanding knack for organization and imparting constructive ideas. SCHLENNBERG has made an exact science out of intelligence work. He would be the man to teach this science in a university. In spite of the above-mentioned limitations SCHLENNBERG has been most successful in organizing and maintaining his own information net, notably in Switzerland and in Sweden. His lack in practical experience, it seems has been amply compensated for by his acumen in judging people and by his judiciousness in dealing with them.
23. To strike the balance of the various elements that make up SCHLENNBERG's character:

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Professionally highly gifted, though not devoid of imperfections.
By all counts, a low character without standards of loyalty and common
decency.
... none who under no circumstances can be trusted.

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